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Abstract—This paper presents a model of collaborative
decision-making for groups that involve people and computer
agents. The model distinguishes between actions relating to
participants’ commitment to the group and actions relating
to their individual tasks, uses this distinction to decompose
group decision making into smaller problems that can be solved
efﬁciently. It allows computer agents to reason about the beneﬁts
of their actions on a collaboration and the ways in which human
participants perceive these beneﬁts. The model was tested in
a setting in which computer agents need to decide whether
to interrupt people to obtain potentially valuable information.
Results show that the magnitude of the beneﬁt of interruption to
the collaboration is a major factor inﬂuencing the likelihood that
people will accept interruption requests. They further establish
that people’s perceived type of their partners (whether humans
or computers) signiﬁcantly affected their perceptions of the
usefulness of interruptions when the beneﬁt of the interruption
is not clear-cut. These results imply that system designers need
to consider not only the possible beneﬁts of interruptions to
collaborative human-computer teams but also the way that such
beneﬁts are perceived by people.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper considers collaborative decision-making in het-
erogeneous groups of computer agents and people. Participants
of a collaborative activity work together towards satisfying a
joint commitment, but they also adopt and care about their
individual goals. To be successful in such settings, agents
need to reason about the effects of their actions on the
collaboration and the way other participants perceive these
actions. This paper proposes a new model for collaborative
decision-making that signiﬁcantly reduces the complexity of
making joint decisions. The model distinguishes between those
situations in which agents’ actions affect the collaboration, and
those in which their actions affect only their individual tasks.
It decomposes the collaboration into smaller interacting sub-
problems that can be analyzed independently and combined to
capture the collaborative utility of an action.
When people participate in collaborative activities with
computer agents it is necessary for the agents to reason about
the ways in which people perceive the utility of the collabo-
ration and its constituent actions. We empirically investigate
the mismatch between the actual utility of an action in a
collaborative context and people’s perception of it, exploring
the different factors that may inﬂuence people’s perception of
this utility. The failure to consider this mismatch may cause
a person to reject a valuable interaction opportunity, thereby
turning what could have been a beneﬁcial interaction for the
collaboration into a performance degrading disturbance.
Our investigations use interruption management as an ex-
ample of a decision making capability needed for collaborative
activities in which agents are distributed, conditions may be
rapidly changing and decisions are made under uncertainty.
Interruptions are important for effective collaborative work,
because agents often possess information required by others on
their team. However, interruptions are inherently disruptive. If
they are not managed and timed properly, they may negatively
affect the emotional state and awareness of the user and
may reduce the overall task performance of the user and the
system [1].
For example, a writer’s collaborative assistant that au-
tonomously searches for bibliographical and citation informa-
tion needs to know when to ask user for information and how
to time requests [2]. If the assistant continuously asks whether
to cite each paper that meets a user’s keywords and commands
it will disrupt the user’s writing process.
Our decoupling model for collaborative decision making,
called DECOP, synthesizes techniques from decision theory
and computer science, but adapts them to collaborative con-
texts. DECOP takes into account the costs and beneﬁts to all
participants, whether human or computer agent, so that deci-
sions to interrupt are based on the collaborative beneﬁt to the
group. Unlike previous models of interruption management,
DECOP also reasons about the possible mismatch between
a computer’s estimate of the utility of an interruption and a
person’s perception of it. It focuses on determining the factors
that inﬂuence people’s perception of interruptions, and their
tendency to accept or reject them when they are generated by
a computer system.
We constructed a computer agent based on DECOP model
in an empirical collaborative setting to investigate the way
people perceive interruptions. We analyzed the effect of three
factors on human perception of the usefulness of interruption
requests: the magnitude of the interruption utility, the timing
of interruptions and the perceived type of the partner (human
or computer agent). The results revealed that the magnitude
of the utility of interruption is the major factor affecting the
likelihood that people will accept interruptions. The results
also indicate that the perceived partner type and cost of the
interruption to the subject affect people’s perception of the
usefulness interruptions when the utility gain is less clear-cut.II. RELATED WORK
Computing joint strategies for multi-agent decision-making
problems under uncertainty has shown to be infeasible for
realistic problems [3]. In this work, we introduce a new
approach for efﬁcient collaborative decision making in the
spirit of near-decomposable models [4]. The remainder of this
section compares our approach to the previous work in the
domain of interruption management.
A key aspect of reasoning about interruptions in collabora-
tive settings is the ability to accurately estimate the costs and
beneﬁts of the interruption to all parties so that the outcome
of the interruption positively affects group task outcomes.
Previous work on adjustable autonomy identiﬁes the points
at which it is most suitable to initiate interactions with a
person, but does so without relating this decision to a user’s
mental state or the task being performed. Interruptions are
driven solely by system needs and managed based on beneﬁt
to the system [5]. Prior work on interruption management has
addressed user needs, but has focused mostly on the effect
an interruption has on a person’s cognitive state, rather than
the beneﬁt of interruptions to collaborative activities [6]. Few
models have combined these two aspects into an integrated
decision making mechanism [7], and none have done so in the
kinds of rapidly changing domains of uncertainty we consider.
While there has been signiﬁcant work on mixed-initiative
system design, there has been little empirical work on how
people perceive interruption utilities and make interruption
decisions in human-computer interaction settings. Avrahami
et al. [8] investigated the differences between a person’s self
report of interruptibility and other people’s predictions about
that person’s interruptibility. However, this work considered
face to face human interaction, rather than human-computer
interaction. Gluck et al. [9] focused on designing notiﬁcation
methods to increase human perception of utility whereas Bunt
et al. [10] showed that displaying system rationale to people
may induce a person to trust a computer system more.
III. THE INTERRUPTION GAME
This section describes a game designed for investigating
the interruption management problem in a setting that does
not require sophisticated domain expertise. The “interruption
game” involves two players, referred to as the “principal”
and the “agent”. Each player needs to complete an individual
task but the two players’ scores depend on each other’s
performance making this a collaborative endeavor.
The game is played on a board of 6x6 squares. Each player
is allocated a starting position and a goal position on the board.
The game comprises a ﬁxed, known number of rounds. At each
round, players advance on the board by moving to an adjacent
square. The players’ goals move stochastically on the board
according to a Gaussian probability distribution centered at
the current position of the player. 1 Players earn 10 points
in the game each time they move to the square on which
1The movement of the goal is restricted in that it does not move closer to
the position of the player.
Fig. 1. Game Screen-shot: me is the principal player, smiley is the agent
player, Gme is the principal’s goal, Gsmiley is the agent’s goal. The degree
to which each square is shaded represents the agent’s uncertainty about its
goal. Dark squares imply higher certainty.
their assigned goal is located, and the goals are reassigned to
random positions on the board. Players can see their positions
and the goal location of the other player, but they differ in
their ability to see their own goal location: The principal can
see the location of its goal throughout the game, while the
agent can see the location of its goal at the onset of the game,
but not during consecutive rounds.
At any round, the agent can choose to interrupt the principal
and request the current location of its goal. The principal is
free to accept or reject an interruption request. If the principal
rejects the interruption request, the players continue moving. If
the interruption is accepted by the principal player, the location
of the agent’s goal in the current round (but not in consecutive
rounds) is automatically revealed to the agent. There is a joint
cost for revealing this information to the agent, in that both
participants will not be able to move for one round. The game
scenarios used in the empirical evaluation are simpliﬁed to
allow a single interruption through the game.
The rules of the game also require the agent to provide
the principal with its belief about the location of its goal.
This information may inﬂuence the principal’s decision about
whether to accept an interruption. A snapshot of the game
from the perspective of the principal player is shown in
Figure 1. The rules of the game provide incentives to players
for reaching their goals as quickly as possible and interruptions
initiated by the agent are critical determinants of players’
performance. The agent’s uncertainty about the location of its
own goal increases over time, and its performance depends on
successfully querying the principal and obtaining the correct
position of its goal.
The game is collaborative in that the score for each player
depends on a combination of its own performance and the
performance of the other player. The players share a jointscore function that is the cumulative score of both players.
An interruption is potentially beneﬁcial for the individual
performance of the agent, who can use this information to
direct its movement, but it only induces the principal’s perfor-
mance negatively. Providing this information is costly for both
players. When the agent deliberates about whether to ask for
information, or when the principal deliberates about whether to
reveal the information to the agent, the players need to weigh
the trade-offs associated with the potential beneﬁt to the agent
player with the detriments to their individual performance in
the game. The success of both players in the game depends
on the agent’s ability to estimate the collaborative value of
interruption at each point in the game and use that information
to choose when to interrupt the principal.
The interruption game is not meant to be a complete model
of any speciﬁc domain or application. Its purpose is to provide
a simple setting in which to study the factors that inﬂuence
interruption management in collaborative settings. It provides
a setting that is analogous to the types of interactions that
occur in collaborative settings involving a mixed network
of computer agents and people. For example, the principal
player in the interruption game may represent the user of a
collaborative system for writing an academic paper, and the
agent may represent the collaborative assistant responsible for
obtaining bibliographical data. While both of the participants
share a common goal of completing a document, each of them
must work independently to complete its individual task, such
as composing paragraphs or searching for bibliographical in-
formation. This aspect is represented in the interruption game
by assigning an individual goal for each player. The movement
of these goals on the board corresponds to the dynamic nature
of these tasks. For example, the user may not know what to
write next, and the system may have uncertainty about search
results. The agent’s lack of information about its own goal
location in the game corresponds to the uncertainty of a system
about the preferences and intentions of its user, such as which
bibliographical information to include in the paper. The ability
to query the user for keywords and to choose among different
bibliographies provides the system with valuable guidance and
direction. It may, however, impede the performance of both
participants on their individual tasks, because the system needs
to suspend its search for bibliographical data when it queries
the user, and the user may be distracted by the query. This
dynamic cost of interruption represents the costs incurred to
both users and computer agents due to task switching and task
recovery for initiating and responding to an interruption.
IV. MODELING INTERRUPTION OPPORTUNITIES
In this section we formalize the interruption game as a
multi-agent decision-making problem under uncertainty, and
we provide efﬁcient methods for computing players’ estimates
of the beneﬁt of interruptions in the game. These models
are not meant to predict how people play the interruption
game or respond to interruption requests in general. Rather,
they provide a way to compute a theoretical baseline, which
is a fully rational computational estimate for the value of
interruption in the game. In the empirical section, we use this
baseline to enable empirical analysis of human behavior in
mixed-initiative settings. This analysis allows the study of the
efﬁcacy of these models when they are used by computers to
interact with people in the game under various experimental
conditions.
The interruption game can be modeled as a Decentralized
Markov Decision Process (Dec-MDP) [11], a formalism for
multi-agent planning that captures the collaborative nature
of the interruption game and its associated uncertainty. A
Dec-MDP includes a set of states with associated transition
probabilities, a set of actions and observations for each agent,
and a joint reward function. A solution of a Dec-MDP is
an optimal joint policy for all agents that is represented as
a mapping from states to actions.
To model the interruption game, the state space of the Dec-
MDP will combine all of the information relating to the tasks
of both players, including their positions on the board, the
positions of their goals, the current round and the belief of the
agent about its own goal position. The solution of the Dec-
MDP assigns a policy to the agent that initiates interruption
requests when they are expected to result in a beneﬁt to both
players according to the joint reward function and assigns a
policy for the principal to accept interruption requests that have
actual positive beneﬁt. Unfortunately, ﬁnding optimal solutions
to Dec-MDPs is NEXP-complete [3]. The size of the state
space makes it infeasible to compute the complete joint policy
for both players in the interruption game.
However, our goal is not to exhaustively compute optimal
policies in the interruption game, but to be able to generate
interruptions when they are perceived to be beneﬁcial to the
collaboration. We hypothesized that such interruptions would
be likely to be accepted by people. Our novel model for
decision making, called DECOP, exploits an important char-
acteristic of this game and many domains in which computer
agents and people work together: When players are not making
or replying to interruption requests, they are performing their
individual tasks, and each player needs to consider only its
individual score in the game. In this case, the two tasks are
essentially independent, and they can be solved separately. As
the agent can only interrupt the principal once, the expected
utility of an interruption can be computed efﬁciently, because
an interruption request will render the two tasks independent
from the interruption moment until the end of the game. At
each turn, the policy for the agent is to interrupt and request
information from the principal when it is deemed beneﬁcial
for both participants. The next section details DECOP model
that captures the beneﬁt of an interruption by solving the indi-
vidual tasks for both participants in the game, and combining
these solutions in order to devise strategies for interruption
management in the game.
A. Computing a Policy for the Principal
The principal has complete information about the game, so
its task can be modeled as a Markov Decision Process (MDP).
Let B denote the set of board positions; jBj denotes the sizeof the game board; p 2 B, g 2 B are the positions of the
principal and its goal respectively; m 2 A is a movement
action of the player; P(g0;p;g) is the probability of the goal
position moving from position g to position g0 when the player
is in position p. The state space of the MDP includes every
possible position of the principal and its goal at each round.
We denote Sh
P = hp;gi to be the state at round h and induce a
state transition function T that assigns a probability to reaching
state S
h+1
P from Sh
P given action m. T can be directly derived
from P. The reward function R assigns the score in the game
for reaching the goal if an action transitions a player to its
goal square, and 0 otherwise.
Let ¦¤
P denote the optimal policy for the principal player
in the game. The value V ¦
¤
P(Sh) of this policy at state Sh
P
maximizes the reward at state Sh
P for an action m and future
states given the transition probability function,
V ¦
¤
P(Sh
P) = maxm[R(Sh
P;m) +
X
Sh+1
T(Sh+1;m;Sh
P)
¢ V ¦
¤
P(S
h+1
P )] (1)
We compute the optimal policy and its value using ExpectiMax
search. In this process we grow a tree with two types of nodes,
decision nodes and chance nodes. There is a decision node
for each state in the MDP, and each child of a decision node
is labeled with a movement action for the principal. Chance
nodes represent moves of nature, and each child of a chance
node is labeled with a possible movement of the goal of
the principal, and is assigned a probability according to the
transition function. When traversing the tree, we recursively
compute a value for each chance node that is a weighted
average of the value of each of its children according to its
probability. We compute a value for each decision node by
choosing the child with the maximal value, and select that
action. With memoization, the number of nodes generated by
the search is bounded by jBj2 ¢ jHj, which is polynomial in
the number of rounds in the game.
B. Computing a Policy for the Agent
The agent cannot observe the position of its goal on the
board, and without interrupting the principal it receives no
information relating to this position. We model its task as a
No Observation Markov Decision Process (NOMDP), which
is a special case of an MDP with no observations. The state
space for this model includes the position l of the agent on
the board, its belief b 2 ¢B over its goal position, and current
turn h. We denote the state for the agent as Sh
A = hl;bi. As
we are modeling the agent’s individual task, rather than its
interaction with the principal, we leave out the interruption
action and use the set of actions A and reward function R
identical to the ones described for the principal player. The
agent updates its belief b to b
0
after each turn according to the
goal movement distribution P as follows:
8c0 2 B;b0(c0) =
X
c2B
b(c) ¢ P(c0;l;c) (2)
The value of an optimal policy for the agent ¦¤
A at state
Sh
A = hl;bi can be computed using Equation 1, substituting
¦¤
A for ¦¤
P and SA for SP. Because the belief of the
agent about its goal position is incorporated into the state
space, there are an inﬁnite number of states to consider, and
using ExpecitMax in a straightforward fashion is not possible.
However, applying the belief update function after each turn,
only a small number of states turn out to be reachable. The
deterministic belief update function maps each combination
of states with full information (i.e., states in which the agent
knows the correct position of its goal) and the number of turns
since full information to a single belief state, thus to a single
state. As a result, we can grow the search tree “on the ﬂy”,
and only expand those states that are reachable after each turn.
Memoization is not possible in this technique, and thus the
complexity of the complete search is exponential in the length
of the horizon.
C. Computing the Beneﬁt of Interruption
To compute the beneﬁt of an interruption, its effect on both
the agent’s and the principal’s individual performance must
be taken into account. It is the aggregate of these two effects
that determines the utility of interruption. An interruption is
initiated by the agent, but it is only established if the principal
accepts it. The effect of an interruption on the individual game
play of a player is the difference of the values of two states;
one in which an interruption is established, and other in which
it is not. Given the principal and its goal are located on squares
p and g respectively in game round h, let EUNI
P (Sh
P = hp;gi)
denote the expected utility of the principal when it is not
interrupted, and pursues its individual task. This is equal to
the value for the principal of carrying out its individual task
as shown in Equation 1. Thus we have,
EUNI
P (Sh
P) = V ¦
¤
P(Sh
P) (3)
For the agent that does not get to observe its own goal position,
let EUNI
A (Sh
A = hl;bi) denote the expected utility of the agent
when it is not interrupted, and pursues its individual task. This
is the value to the agent of carrying out its individual task:
EUNI
A (Sh
A) = V ¦
¤
A(Sh
A) (4)
Let EUI
P(Sh
P = hp;gi) denote the expected utility for
the principal when it accepts an interruption. If the principal
player is interrupted, it cannot move for one round, but its
goal may move stochastically according to the probability
distribution P. We denote the new goal position as gh+1.
Given our constraint that there can only be one interruption
made in the game, the beneﬁt of interruption for the principal
is the expected value of its individual task in future rounds,
for any possible position of its goal. Formally, the utility of
interruption for state Sh
P, denoted EUI
P(Sh
P) is computed as
follows:
EUI
P(Sh
P) =
X
gh+12B
P(gh+1;p;g) ¢ V ¦
¤
P(S
h+1
P =
­
p;gh+1®
)
(5)If the agent successfully interrupts the principal, the prin-
cipal will reveal the position of the agent’s goal. The agent
will update its belief about its goal position in the following
round, and use this belief to perform its individual task in
future rounds. However, when it deliberates about whether to
interrupt in the current round, it needs to to sum over every
possible position of its unobserved goal, according to its belief
about the goal location. Let Sh
A = hl;bi be the current state of
the agent, including its position on the board and belief about
its goal position. Let g denote the current position of its goal.
The expected value for interruption for the agent is denoted
EUI
A and is computed as follows:
EUI
A(Sh
A) =
X
g2B
b(g) ¢ V ¦
¤
A(S
h+1
A = hl;b0i) (6)
Here, b0 refers to the belief state of the agent in which
probability 1 is given to g, the true position of its goal as
revealed by the principal, and updated once to reﬂect the
stochastic movement of the goal in turn h.
D. Deciding Whether to Interrupt
By combining the expected values of the principal and agent
players with and without interruption, it is now possible to
compute the agent’s estimate of the beneﬁt of an interruption.
We denote EBIP(Sh
P) to be the expected beneﬁt of interrup-
tion for the principal given Sh
P, which is simply the difference
in utility of the principal between accepting and interruption
and carrying out its individual task.
EBIP(Sh
P) = EUI
P(Sh
P) ¡ EUNI
P (Sh
P) (7)
The expected beneﬁt of interruption for the agent is denoted
EBIA(Sh
A) and is computed similarly:
EBIA(Sh
A) = EUI
A(Sh
A) ¡ EUNI
A (Sh
A) (8)
The interruption game is collaborative in that the combined
performance of both participants determines their individual
scores. The agent can observe the state Sh
P of the principal, and
for any combined state Sh = (Sh
P;Sh
A), the agent will consider
the joint expected beneﬁt of interruption to both participants,
EBI, and choose to interrupt if this joint beneﬁt is positive.
EBI(Sh) = EBIP(Sh
P) + EBIA(Sh
A) (9)
The agent cannot observe the correct position of its goal
and estimates the beneﬁt of interrupting under this uncertainty.
Thus, not every interruption initiated by the agent is truly ben-
eﬁcial for the team. In contrast, the principal can observe the
position of agent’s goal and can capture the actual beneﬁt of
the interruption, denoted ABI with certainty. Any interruption
with positive ABI offers a positive expected beneﬁt to the
team. The value of ABI is the sum of the individual beneﬁts
of interruption to both the principal and the agent.
Let ga be the agent’s goal position, the actual beneﬁt of
interruption for both participants given states Sh
P and Sh
A is
ABI(Sh) = EBIP(Sh
P) + EBIP;A(Sh
A) (10)
Here, the term EBIP;A(Sh
A) refers to the principal’s percep-
tion of the agent’s beneﬁt from revealing the goal position ga,
where l is the current position of the agent, b0 refers to the
belief state of the agent in which probability 1 is given to ga
and updated once.
EBIP;A(Sh
A) = V ¦
¤
A(S
h+1
A = hl;b0i) ¡ EUNI
A (Sh
A) (11)
The advantage of DECOP model introduced above is that
it reduces the complexity of the multi-agent decision making
process to that of two separate single agent decision making
processes. Because the agent is allowed to interrupt only
once during a game-play, the decoupling method is able to
accurately capture the beneﬁt of an interruption initiated by
the agent. DECOP model assumes that principal players are
fully rational and computationally unbounded. In the case of
such players, we would expect any interruption with positive
ABI to be accepted, and any interruption with negative ABI
to be rejected. However, people may not be fully rational
or computationally unbounded, and we expect people’s per-
ception of the beneﬁt of interruptions to differ from baseline
values calculated by DECOP model. In the empirical inves-
tigations described in the next section, these baseline values
are compared with the subject responses to detect the possible
mismatch between a computer’s estimate of the beneﬁt of an
interruption and a person’s perception of it, and to identify a
subset of factors that affect the way that humans perceive the
effectiveness of interruptions.
V. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
This section uses strategies derived from DECOP model
for playing the interruption game to explore the way people
make decisions in an empirical setting. A total of 26 subjects
participated in the study. The subjects were between ages
of 19 and 46 and were given a 20 minute tutorial of the
game. Subjects played between 25 to 35 games each, and were
compensated in a manner that was proportional to their total
performance.
During the empirical evaluation, all subjects were allocated
to play the roles of principals, while the role of the agent was
assigned to a computer that used the methodology described
in the previous section to play the interruption game. Each
game proceeded in the manner described in Section III. In
particular, the agent could not observe its own goal location,
but is allowed to initiate an interruption once to acquire the
correct location of its goal from the principal. At each turn
of the game, the policy of the agent is to interrupt only if the
expected beneﬁt of an interruption (EBI) is positive
Interruptions were generated by the computer agents at
different points in the game with varying actual beneﬁts, game
levels and perceived partner types. We measured people’s
responses to these requests given the game conditions at the
time of interruptions, which included the number of turns left
to play, the positions of both players on the board, and the
agent’s belief about the location of its goal.
A principal player that uses DECOP model to determine
whether to accept an interruption request is perfectly rationalin that is uses the collaborative beneﬁt of interruption (ABI),
given in Equation 10, as the sole factor for this decision.
However, we expected people to differ from this rational
model. The purpose of the empirical work is to measure
the extent to which different factors in the game, such as
the collaborative beneﬁt of interruption (ABI), the timing of
interruptions and the perceived partner type, inﬂuence people’s
perception of interruptions. To investigate the way subject
responses change with respect to beneﬁt of interruptions, the
game scenarios were varied to have different ABI values. To
investigate the effect of the timing of an interruption on the
subjects’ likelihood of acceptance, we varied the level of the
game that an interruption is initiated. Lastly, we expected that
the type of agent player (whether a computer or human) would
affect the way people respond to interruption requests. For
this reason, subjects were told they would be interacting with
a human for some games, however they were always paired
with an agent 2.
Subjects were given randomly generated game scenarios
that vary the actual beneﬁt of interruption to both participants
(ABI) to cover four types of values: -1.5 (small loss), 1.0
(small gain), 3.5 (medium gain), 6.0 (large gain). These values
represent the smallest and largest beneﬁt values that can be
generated from interruptions with positive expected beneﬁt
(EBI), which is a necessary condition to initiate interruption
requests by the agent player. The levels in the game in which
interruptions occurred varied to cover the beginning of a game
(level 3), the middle of a game (level 5) and the end of a game
(level 7). There were 540 game instances played when the
perceived agent was a computer (PP:Computer) and 228 data
points when the perceived agent was a person (PP:Person).
VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The following results analyze a total of 768 game instances
collected in our study. Table 1 shows interruption acceptance
rates for different levels and ABI values for the same game
instances when perceived partner type (PP) is person or agent.
The optimal policy for the principal player is to accept an
interruption if its associated beneﬁt (ABI) is positive and to
reject otherwise.
PP:Computer Level 3 Level 5 Level 7
ABI -1.5 0.16 0.16 0.41
ABI 1.0 0.27 0.7 0.81
ABI 3.5 0.91 0.97 0.79
ABI 6.0 0.91 0.95 0.95
PP:Person Level 3 Level 5 Level 7
ABI -1.5 0 0.11 0.44
ABI 1.0 0.72 0.94 1
ABI 3.5 0.91 0.94 0.88
ABI 6.0 1 0.88 1
TABLE I
ACCEPTANCE RATE OF INTERRUPTIONS
2Approval was obtained for the use of human subjects in research for this
misinformation.
Fig. 2. Effect of interruption beneﬁt and perceived partner type on
interruption acceptance rate
As the results of Table 1 show, the utility of an interruption
is the major factor inﬂuencing the probability that an interrup-
tion will be accepted by a person. The interruption acceptance
rate increases signiﬁcantly as the beneﬁt of interruption rises
from -1.5 to 1.0 (p < e¡20, ®=0.001) and from 1.0 to 3.5
(p=0.0013, ®=0.01). However the rise from 3.5 to 6.0 does
not further improve the acceptance rate. These results conﬁrm
that people were successful at perceiving interruption beneﬁts
above a certain threshold. Similarly, when an interruption
is costly for the collaboration, people are signiﬁcantly more
likely to reject the interruption. However, subjects varied in
their responses to interruptions offering slightly positive gains,
indicating the difﬁculty to estimate the beneﬁt of interruption
when its usefulness is ambiguous.
Figure 2 summarizes the acceptance rates of interruption as
a function of the actual beneﬁt of interruption and perceived
partner type (person vs. computer). We divide the ﬁgure into
three regions of interruption beneﬁts: small losses (Region
1), small gains (Region 2), and large gains (Region 3). The
analysis shows that for large losses (Region 1) and for small
gains (Region 3), changing the perceived partner type does not
affect the likelihood that the interruption will be accepted. In
contrast, for interruptions offering small gains (Region 2), the
acceptance rate is signiﬁcantly larger if the perceived partner
type is a person (p = 3 £ 10¡5, ® = 0:001). This result
implies that when the beneﬁt of interruption is straightforward,
people do not care whether the initiator of the interruption is
a person or a computer. However, for those cases in which
the beneﬁt of interruption is ambiguous, people are more
likely to accept interruptions that originate from other people.
This result suggests that agent designers need to consider the
way they present interruptions to their users in cases where
the perceived beneﬁt is ambiguous. It also aligns with recent
studies showing that mutual cooperation is more difﬁcult to
achieve in human-computer settings as compared to settings
involving people exclusively [12].
Figure 3 shows the effect of interruption timing (the level
of the game) on people’s acceptance rates for interruptions of
small losses and small gains (The interruption timing does not
affect the acceptance rate for interruptions of large gains). WeFig. 3. Correlation of interruption acceptance rate with the cost of interruption
to subjects (-ABIP) for small gains and losses.
expected that interruptions occurring late in the game (i.e.,
with fewer number of turns left in the game) will be more
likely to be accepted when they incur positive beneﬁt, and
rejected when incurring a loss. However, as shown by the
Figure 3, as the game level increases, so does the acceptance
rate for interruptions of both small losses (ABI -1) and small
gains (ABI 1). There is a signiﬁcant increase in the acceptance
rate when game level increases from 3 to 5 (p=0.002, ®=0.01)
and from 5 to 7 (p< 10¡6, ®=0.001).
One factor that may explain the correlation between the
acceptance rate and the game level for interruptions of small
gains and losses, is the cost of interruption to the subject.
As shown in Figure 3, the cost of interruption to the subject
(ABIP) decreases as game level increases. Thus, for interrup-
tions of small gains and losses, we found that the acceptance
rate is negatively correlated with the cost of interruption to the
principal. In addition, it was revealed that the beneﬁt of the
interruption to the principal (ABIP) is a better predictor of the
acceptance rate than ABIA, the beneﬁt of interruption to the
agent (logistic regression SE = 0:05;R2 = 0:19;p < 0:001).
Thus, human subjects tend to overestimate their own beneﬁt
from interruptions as compared to the beneﬁt for the agent.
Consequently, the beneﬁt of interruption to person may be
weighted more in person decision making model than the
beneﬁt of the interruption, and people may be more likely
to accept an interruption with low ABIP among interruptions
with identical beneﬁt. Further study is required to determine
whether these conjectures hold and better understand the
correlation of acceptance rate with the cost of interruption
to the person. This conjecture is supported by some subject
responses to survey questions regarding their strategies for
accepting interruptions. Answers include:
“If the agent was in the totally wrong direction and I had
several moves left, I would allow the interruption. I always
wanted the sure thing for myself.”
“If the collaborator was way off in knowing and had enough
moves to likely catch it after I told the location, I accepted. If
it compromised my ability to get my goal, I declined.”
Lastly, we emphasize that these results are a ﬁrst step in
understanding the human perception of interruptions in col-
laborative settings. Our goal was not to design computational
strategies directly applicable for interruption management in
real world domains, but rather to show that effective interrup-
tion management needs to consider the collaborative beneﬁt
of interruption to both user and system, and to point system
designers to the types of factors that people consider when they
reason about interruptions. In future work, we plan to extend
the study to better understand the effects of computational
and cognitive complexity on people’s interruption strategies,
focusing on the possible role of trust and overestimation of
costs.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have presented a novel model for collaborative decision-
making that computes the utility of actions from the possibly
different perspective of the participants of the collaborative ac-
tivity. We evaluated the model in a specially designed human-
computer collaborative setting in which computers need to
manage their interruption requests to humans. We showed that
the actual beneﬁt of interruptions to both computer agents and
people is the major factor affecting the likelihood that people
will accept interruption requests. However, for those cases in
which the beneﬁt of interruption is ambiguous, people prefer
to accept those interruptions that originate from other people.
Our empirical studies provide a number of insights about
human decision making in the context of human-computer
collaboration in dynamic, uncertain domains. Understanding
the way that people make interruption decisions will enable the
development of better mechanisms for initiating interruptions,
focusing on the interruptions that are more likely to be
accepted. These investigations will provide the foundation for
building agents that collaborate with people efﬁciently without
overburdening them.
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